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We present a model for representing search in theorem proving. This
model captures the notion of contraction, which has been central in some
of the recent developments in theorem proving. We outline an approach
to measuring the complexity of search which can be applied to analyze
and evaluate the behaviour of theorem-proving strategies. Using our
framework, we compare contraction-based strategies of different contraction
power and show how they affect the evolution of the respective search
spaces during the derivation. ] 1998 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Theorem-proving problems usually have infinite search spaces. Theorem-proving
strategies with contraction inference rulesrules that delete clauses, such as
simplification and subsumptionare known to have in general better performance
than strategies without such rules. The intuitive explanation of this experimental
phenomenon is that contraction inference rules prune the search space, thus allowing
the strategy to find a solution in shorter time. However, there has not been any
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formal mathematical analysis to explain how contraction rules affect the complexity
of search in theorem proving. The main reason for this is the lack of formal tools
to analyze the complexity of strategies involving search in an infinite search space.
Indeed, the absence of such a formal method for assessing the effectiveness of
inference strategies has been one of the serious weak points of artificial intelligence.
Traditional algorithm analysis is concerned mainly with the asymptotic analysis
of finite objects. The two dominating measures are time and space, which are tightly
related to each other. For instance, if a problem has a lower bound of n2 space
complexity, one cannot expect to find an algorithm that runs in time less than n2.
Such a methodology is not suitable for analyzing search strategies in theorem
proving (or in artificial intelligence in general), since the search space of a typical
theorem-proving problem is infinite. Given that the search space is infinite, it is no
longer meaningful to discuss average case analysis, much less worst case. However,
contemporary theorem provers from different approaches (e.g., [2, 3, 23, 2628, 30,
39, 44]) are still capable of solving problems of practical interest (e.g., [1, 2, 29, 40]).
This is mainly because the existence of an infinite search space may not require an
infinite amount of computation time, since it is not necessary to traverse the entire
search space to find a proof. Thus, one needs a new way of analysis in order to
reason and compare theorem-proving strategies.
The difficulty of analyzing the complexity of search in an infinite space appears
in many ways. One is the absence of a relationship between the complexity of the
computation and the input of the problem. In a finite problem the time and space
complexities can usually be treated as functions of a measure of the input. But for
first-order logic, for instance, the difficulty of finding a proof is not related to the
size of the input set of clauses. A source of the problem is that a set of first-order
clauses represents more than itself; it represents the infinite set of the ground instances
of the clauses. Thus, any measure based on the input alone is not sufficient.
Neither is the complexity of a search strategy related to its output. In theorem
proving, the output is the computed proof, if a proof is produced. The size of the
proof is generally not indicative of the difficulty of finding the proof, since one may
find a simple proof after an extensive traversal of the search space. Thus, a more
accurate notion of complexity should be how difficult the process of finding the
proof is, rather than either the input or the output of the computation.
In this paper we present an approach for the analysis and comparison of theorem
proving strategies. To demonstrate how it is used, we apply our framework to
analyze the effect of contraction in forward-reasoning strategies, such as those
originated from rewriting-based methods on one hand, and the resolution-para-
modulation paradigm on the other (e.g., [14, 16, 18] for general reference). We
should mention that very little is known about the analysis of infinite search
problems. Therefore the majority of the definitions in this paper are new.
In the rest of this section, we briefly outline the ingredients of our approach.
Representation of Search Space
The first task is to provide an appropriate representation of the search space of
a theorem-proving strategy. This task is made difficult by the existence of contraction
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inferences. If one considers only inference rules that generate clauses from existing
clausescalled expansion rules, such as resolutionthe well-known approach
of Kowalski [24] should be sufficient. In [24], a search space is represented as an
infinite graph with vertices representing the clauses and arcs representing the
inferences. When the strategy generates a clause the corresponding vertex is
reached. The search graph is static and the action of the strategy consists in visiting
the search graph.
If the strategy contains contraction rules, the behaviour of the strategy cannot be
described solely in terms of visiting a graph, because whenever the strategy
performs a contraction inference a clause is deleted. The execution of the strategy
modifies the search space. Furthermore, the modification is not merely local,
because the deletion of one clause may affect the reachability of others. It follows
that the search space for a strategy with contraction is essentially dynamic. The
main ideas in our solution of this problem are:
v we distinguish between a static part and a dynamic part and we represent
them by two different components;
v we point out that the proper representation of contraction needs to employ
both the static component and the dynamic component.
The static part depends only on the inference system, that is, all the applicable
inferences in the search space. We represent it by a search graph with vertices
labelled by clauses and arcs labelled by inference rules. The dynamic part depends
also on the search plan, which decides the actual inference steps chosen during a
derivation.1 We capture it by a marking of the vertices of the graph. Thus, the
search space is represented as a marked search-graph. The generation and deletion
of clauses are performed on the graph by incrementingdecrementing the marking
of the vertices representing the clauses involved. This approach provides a natural
way of reflecting a theorem-proving derivation on the search graph, by associating
a marking of the search graph to each state of the derivation.
Complexity Measures
The second task is to define a proper notion of complexity measures. A
complexity measure is essentially a well-founded ordering. More precisely, one needs
to take into consideration
1. the entities, such as search strategies or proofs, whose complexity is being
investigated;
2. mathematical objects that are representatives of the aforementioned
entities;
3. a well-founded ordering to compare the objects.
The phrase complexity measure in complexity theory often refers only to (2). This
is because the conventional complexity measures implicitly assume the natural
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1 A derivation is the computation by a theorem-proving strategy.
(well-founded) ordering on N (the non-negative integers). The well-founded ordering
for our purpose may not be based on the ordering on N, and therefore we need
to work with a notion of complexity measure that comprises (2) and (3). For our
problem, the entities are the search spaces of theorem-proving strategies, and we
need to find appropriate complexity measures.
The domains
In conventional analysis of algorithms, the complexity measures of time and
space refer to the history of the computation by the algorithm from the initial state
to the final state. The history of the computation is the domain over which the
measures have meaning. A computation by a forward-reasoning theorem-proving
strategy is a derivation
S0 VS1V } } } S i V } } } ,
where S0 is the initial set of clauses and Si is the set of clauses after i inference steps.
Since theorem-proving derivations may not halt (the search space is infinite), the
computation is open-ended and we cannot reason in terms of history from the
initial to the final state. We reason in a different way: at each stage of a derivation
a finite portion of the search space has been generated and an infinite portion
remains to be explored. We call the former the present and the latter the future of
the derivation. Pictorially, one can think of the search space as an iceberg, where
the present is the emerging part and the future the part under the water. Another
metaphor is the labyrinth: the present is where we are, the future is the rest of the
labyrinth. In order to capture the complexity of the search problem in the global
search space, the analysis needs to involve both domains, the present and the future.
In more concrete terms, we need to measure the effects of the inference steps performed
by the strategy up to stage k not only on the clauses generated up to stage k (the
present), but also on the search space that remains to be explored after stage k (the
future).
Complexity Measures for Theorem Proving
Having identified the appropriate domains for the analysis, we need to define
mathematical objects (point 2 of above) that are representatives of the behaviour
of a strategy on such domains. For the present, we consider the multiset of existing
clauses at any stage k of the derivation. For the future, we partition the infinite
search space into an infinite succession of finite bounded search spaces. A bounded
search space of bound j is the space of clauses that can be reached from the input
by at most j steps. Unlike a static notion such as a path length, this notion of
reachability reflects the past actions of the strategy. This is because the inference
steps may affect the reachability of clauses that have not been generated. In
particular, a step that deletes a clause may make other clauses unreachable. Thus,
the succession of bounded search spaces changes at every step in the derivation. In
this way we can capture the effect of inferences on the future. Bounded search
spaces are also characterized as multisets of clauses.
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For theorem-proving strategies which assume a well-founded ordering on the set
of clauses, e.g., [35], it is natural to use the multiset extension of the same ordering,
which is also well-founded, as the ordering in the complexity measures for theorem
proving.
Analysis of Strategies
For the last task of the paper, we demonstrate how our framework is applied to
the analysis and comparison of different strategies with contraction. We analyze
first the effects of expansion and contraction on the bounded search spaces. We
prove that contraction steps contract the bounded search spaces by making redundant
clauses unreachable. Thus, while expansion inferences allow the strategy to visit the
search space, contraction inferences also enable the strategy to prune it. Let C1
and C2 be two strategies with the same search plan and the same set of expansion
inference rules, but C2 has a higher degree of contraction power than C1 .
2 We
compare the derivations generated by C1 and C2 from the same input. Note that the
two strategies start with different search spaces, since contraction inferences are
part of the search space, and C2 has more. We show that C2 eventually induces a
higher reduction of the bounded search spaces. Therefore, contraction reduces the
complexity of the search process according to our measures.
Comparison with Other Work
The classical representation of the search space of clauses for a theorem-proving
problem was given in [24]. Our work is essentially compatible with [24] for the
representation of expansion inferences, and adds the representation of contraction.
Most works on search strategies emphasized the design of heuristics (e.g., [32]),
while studies of the complexity of theorem proving analyzed provability or the
length of computed proofs (e.g., [17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 31, 34, 38, 41, 42] and [43]
for a survey; see also Section 7.1 for further discussion of these works). Our
problem is the complexity of search. This is also the interest of [33], that analyzed
the duplication in the search spaces generated by most of the known theorem-
proving strategies applied to propositional Horn logic. Unlike ours, the analyzed
search spaces are finite, and therefore the approach in [33] may apply worst-case
analysis and classical counting techniques.
Organization of the Paper
Section 2 contains the basic definitions. Section 3 is dedicated to the representation
of the search space: the search graph, the marking and the association of a
search graph to each stage of a derivation. The section is closed by a comparison
with previous work on the representation problem. Section 4 is devoted to the
complexity measures for theorem proving, and it includes the definition of bounded
search spaces. In Section 5 we analyze the effects of inferences on the search space
and in 6 we apply our complexity measures to compare the behaviour of different
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2 The case where C1 has no contraction rules is included as a special case.
strategies. Section 7 contains a comparison with other approaches, a summary, and
a discussion of problems. A preliminary version has been available in [13].
2. INFERENCE RULES, SEARCH PLAN, AND DERIVATION
In this section we give the basic definitions and notations that will be used in the
paper. Given a signature 3, we denote by L3 the language of all the clauses on
signature 3 and by P(L3) its powerset. A theorem-proving problem (S0 ; .0) is the
problem of deciding whether S0<.0 , or, refutationally, whether S=S0 _ [c.0]
is inconsistent. We consider theorem-proving problems in clausal form, where
.0 # L3 , S0 # P(L3), and inconsistency is shown by deriving the empty clause g
from S.
2.1. The Inference Component of a Strategy
Theorems are proved by means of inference rules. Because we are interested in
the effects of inference rules on the search space, we classify them into expansion
inference rules and contraction inference rules. Expansion inference rules, such as
resolution and paramodulation [16], derive new clauses from the existing ones and
add the new to the old. Contraction inference rules, such as tautology deletion,
proper subsumption and equational simplification [16, 18], delete clauses and
possibly replace them by smaller ones, according to a well-founded ordering o on
clauses. We define formally an inference rule as a function3 that takes a tuple of
premises and yields two sets, the set of clauses to be added and the set of clauses
to be deleted.
Definition 2.1. Given a signature 3, an inference rule f n of arity n is a function
f n: Ln3  P(L3)_P(L3).
If f n does not apply to a tuple x # Ln3 , both output sets are empty. A set of
inference rules I forms an inference system or inference mechanism. Let ?1 and ?2
be the projection functions (x, y)  x and (x, y)  y. Given a set of clauses S,
the set obtained by adding to S the clauses generated by I in one step is
I(S)=S _ [. | . # ?1( f (.1 , ..., .n)) for f # I, .1 , ..., .n # S].
We can then distinguish between expansion and contraction as follows:
Definition 2.2. Given a well-founded ordering on clauses (L3 , o), an inference
rule f n is an expansion inference rule if for all premises x # Ln3 , ?2( f
n(x ))=<; it
is a contraction inference rule with respect to o if ?2( f n(x )){< for some x , and
whenever ?1( f n(x )){<, for all . # ?1( f n(x )) there exists a  # ?2( f n(x )) such that
o..
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3 For simplicity, we assume that a signature is fixed and therefore an inference rule can be defined as
a function. A more general definition that makes an inference rule independent from the signature by
defining it as a natural transformation can be found in [15].
The ordering on clauses is often based on a complete simplification ordering
[22] on the atoms, and then extended to clauses via the multiset ordering. Take the
inference rule of (equational) simplification as an example. The inference step which
uses the rewrite rule f (x)  x to simplify clause P( f ( f (0))) to P(0) is formulated as
simplification(P( f ( f (0))), f (x)  x)=([P(0)], [P( f ( f (0)))]).
This is legitimate since P( f ( f (0)))oP(0) in any complete simplification ordering.
Clauses deleted by contraction are said to be redundant, in the sense that they are
not necessary for proving the theorem (e.g., [9, 14]). Accordingly, it is possible to
justify a contraction rule by a redundancy criterion [9]. A redundancy criterion
is a mapping R on sets of clauses, such that R(S) is the set of clauses that are
redundant with respect to S according to R:
Definition 2.3 (Bachmair and Ganzinger 1992) [9]. A mapping R from sets of
clauses to sets of clauses is called a redundancy criterion if
1. S&R(S)<R(S) (the criterion is sound),
2. if SS$, then R(S)R(S$) (the criterion is monotonic) and
3. if (S$&S)R(S$), then R(S$)R(S) (redundant clauses are irrelevant for
establishing other redundancies).
The first property complements the soundness of expansion (all generated clauses
are logical consequences of their premises), by asking that clauses that are redundant,
and therefore can be deleted by contraction, are logical consequences of the
remaining clauses. The other two properties will be used in the following. Given a
redundancy criterion R, a set of contraction rules IR is associated to R, if all clauses
that can be deleted by IR with a set S are in R(S), and whenever . is in R(S) & S,
IR can delete .. Both R and IR assume the same well-founded ordering. If we need
to distinguish expansion and contraction rules in the inference system, we write
I=Ie _ IR , meaning that Ie contains the expansion rules, IR contains the contraction
rules and the contraction rules are justified by the redundancy criterion R.
A main motivation for defining redundancy criteria and not only contraction
rules is that a redundancy criterion also captures the redundancy of clauses that are
not in the existing set. Indeed, note that since a clause generated from a redundant
clause in S may also be redundant, R(S) may not be a subset of S. An inference
step that uses a redundant clause is a redundant inference step.4 Keeping with the
above example, since clause P( f ( f (0))) is redundant in any set that contains P(0)
and f (x)  x, all inferences that use P( f ( f (0))) are also redundant. In addition to
contraction rules, redundancy criteria may be used to refine expansion rules (e.g.,
[5]) to further prevent the generation of redundant clauses.
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4 We remark that a clause generated by a redundant inference step may not be redundant since the
same clause may also be generated by a non-redundant step.
2.2. The Search Component of a Strategy
An inference system I is usually nondeterministic in nature, since typically more
than one rule in I applies to different tuples of clauses in the set. Therefore, a
theorem-proving strategy C=(I, 7) is given by an inference system I and a search
plan 7. From an operational point of view, a search plan is a mechanism that
controls the application of an inference system: given a set of clauses and the inference
rules, the search plan chooses the step to be executed among all possible candidates.
We define a state of a theorem-proving problem to be a multiset of clauses, and
use States for the set of all possible states of the problem. A search plan chooses
the next step based on the current state and the previous history, represented as a
sequence of states (set States*). More precisely, a search plan 7 is given by three
components, a function ‘ to choose the inference rule, a function ! to choose the
tuple of premises, and a function | to detect termination. If ‘ selects an inference
rule of arity n, ! selects a tuple of n premises in the database of the current state:
Definition 2.4. A search plan 7 for a set of inference rules I is a triple 7=(‘, !, |)
where
1. ‘: States*  I is the rule-selecting function,
2. !: States*_I  L*3 is the premise-selecting function, such that if
‘((S0 , S1 , ..., Si))= f n, then !((S0 , S1 , ..., S i), f n) # S ni (i0), and
3. |: States  [true, false] is the termination-detecting function, such that
|(Sk)=true (k0) if and only if Sk contains the empty clause.
Premise-selecting functions often work by sorting clauses based on some well-
founded ordering, e.g., by age, by size, by a simplification ordering, and selecting
minimal clauses. A theorem prover may implement more than one search plan and
therefore different premise-selecting functions. The evaluation function of [24] is
similar to the premise-selecting function, but it is defined directly on the search
space, rather than on the derivation. There is no rule-selecting function in [24],
because the only inference rule is resolution.
If ‘ chooses the inference rule f n and ! chooses the tuple of premises x , the
application of f n to x gives two sets of sentences, ?1( f n(x )) and ?2( f n(x )), with the
meaning that the clauses in ?1( f n(x )) should be added, whereas the clauses in
?2( f n(x )) should be deleted:
Definition 2.5. Given a theorem-proving problem S, the derivation generated
by a strategy C=(I, 7) , with 7=(‘, !, |) , on input S is the sequence
S=S0 VC S1 VC } } } VC S i VC } } } such that for all i0, if
v |(Si)= false,
v ‘((S0 , S1 , ..., Si))= f n, f n # I and
v !((S0 , S1 , ..., Si), f n)=x , x # S ni ,
then Si+1=S i _ ?1( f n(x ))&?2( f n(x )).
A derivation has the monotonicity property R(S0)R(S1) } } } . That is, clauses
that are redundant at a given stage of a derivation are also redundant at all the
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following stages. (This property is implied by the second and third requirements in
Definition 2.3). A derivation is successful if |(Sk)=true for some k, and a strategy
C=(I, 7) is complete if it is guaranteed to succeed whenever the input set is
inconsistent. A complete strategy is a semidecision procedure which computes the
partial function that maps the input state S0 to Sk if |(Sk)=true for some k, and
is undefined otherwise. If I is refutationally complete (successful derivations in I
exist for all inconsistent inputs) and 7 is fair (whenever successful derivations exist,
the one constructed by 7 is successful), then C is complete [14]. A sufficient condition
for fairness is uniform fairness:
Definition 2.6 (Bachmair and Ganzinger 1992) [9]. Given a set of inference
rules I and a redundancy criterion R, a derivation S0 VS1 V } } } Si V } } } is uniformly
fair with respect to I and R if I(S&R(S)) j0 S j , where S=j0 i j Si
is the set of persistent clauses.
In other words, all clauses that can be generated by I from persistent, non-
redundant premises are generated eventually. A search plan 7 is uniformly fair with
respect to I and R if all the derivations controlled by 7 are uniformly fair. Let
C=(Ie _ IR , 7) be a strategy such that IR contains only contraction rules that
delete clauses without generating any, 7 is uniformly fair with respect to Ie and R,
and C is complete. If I$R is a set of contraction rules that replace clauses redundant
according to R by smaller clauses, the strategy C$=(Ie _ IR _ I$R , 7) is also
complete. This means that it is sufficient that 7 is uniformly fair with respect to Ie
and R [9]. A search plan that always gives priority to contraction rules is an eager-
contraction search plan, and a strategy that features contraction inference rules and
an eager-contraction search plan is a contraction-based strategy.
3. REPRESENTATION OF THE SEARCH SPACE
The search space of a theorem-proving problem contains all the clauses that can
be derived from the problem by using the inference rules:
Definition 3.1. Given a theorem-proving problem S and an inference system I,
the closure of S by I is the set SI*=k0 I k(S), where I 0(S)=S and Ik(S)=
I(Ik&1(S)) for all k1.
If the system I contains both expansion and contraction rules, the closure
contains all the clauses that can be generated by rules of either type. If S is inconsistent
and I is refutationally complete, then SI* contains the empty clause.
We represent the search space as a search graph with vertices labelled by clauses
in SI* and arcs labelled by inference rules. Since inference steps generally have multiple
premises, and possibly multiple consequences, the search graph will be a hyper-
graph. For the labels of the vertices we choose not to distinguish between variants: all
variants of a clause will be associated to the same vertex. Given a signature 3, we
denote by L3 . the quotient set of L3 with respect to the relation . of equivalence
up to variable renaming:
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Definition 3.2. Given a signature 3, a theorem proving problem S on 3, a set
of inference rules I and a graph (V, E), an arc-labelling function is a function
h: E  I, and a vertex-labelling function is an injective function l: V  L3 . , whose
restriction l: V  SI* . is a bijection.
Thus, l(v) is a representative of an equivalence class of variants. In the following
we refer to l(v) as a clause, meaning implicitly a representative of a class of variants.
A vertex-labelling function is required to be injective, so that only one vertex
corresponds to each clause. It is surjective only on the closure SI*, since all the
clauses in the search space have a vertex, but this is not necessarily true for all the
clauses in the language.
The search graph will have a hyperarc for every applicable inference:
Definition 3.3. Given a theorem-proving problem S on signature 3 and a set
of inference rules I, the search space induced by S and I is represented by the search
graph G(SI*)=(V, E, l, h), where V is the set of vertices, l is a vertex-labelling function
l: V  L3 ., h is an arc-labelling function h: E  I and if
f n(.1 , ..., .n)=([1 , ..., m], [:1 , ..., :p])
E contains a hyperarc
e=(v1 , ..., vk ; w1 , ..., wp ; u1 , ..., um),
where
v h(e)= f n,
v v1 , ..., vk are the vertices labelled by those premises that are not deleted, i.e.,
l(vj)=.j and .j  [:1 , ..., :p], for all j, 1 jk, where 1kn,
v w1 , ..., wp are the vertices labelled by the deleted clauses, i.e., l(w j)=:j , for
all j, 1 j p, and
v u1 , ..., um are the vertices labelled by the generated clauses, i.e., l(uj)= j , for
all j, 1 jm.
In order to simplify the notation, we use interchangeably vertices and their labels,
e.g., v and . if .=l(v). Without loss of generality, we consider hyperarcs in the
form (v1 , ..., vn ; w; u), where at most one clause is added or deleted. A hyperarc in
the general form can be replaced by multiple hyperarcs of the simpler type. If the
inference rule f n is an expansion rule, no clause is deleted, and therefore the hyper-
arc is written (v1 , ..., vn ; u). For instance, in resolution, =l(u) is the resolvent
resulting from parents .1 , ..., .n . This representation applies similarly to other
expansion inference rules such as hyperresolution and paramodulation [16]. Thus,
our representation of expansion is basically compatible with the classical represen-
tation of resolution (e.g., [24]). Figure 1 shows examples of hyperarcs. Arrows are
used for the contraction hyperarcs.
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FIG. 1. From left to right, a binary resolution hyperarc, a simplification hyperarc, and a subsumption
hyperarc.
3.1. Contraction Inferences in the Search Graph
The general form of a contraction hyperarc is (v1 , ..., vn ; w; u), where .=l(w) is
replaced by .$=l(u), .o.$ in the ordering on clauses, and the clauses of v1 , ..., vn
justify the step. We show how this scheme applies to some of the most frequently
used contraction rules. We consider first simplification inference rules:
v The simplification of a clause . to .$ by an equation s& t is represented by
the hyperarc (v; w; u), where v, w and u are the vertices of s& t, . and .$, respec-
tively, and .o.$. The center picture in Fig. 1 is an example. Clausal simplification
of . to .$ by a unit clause L is represented similarly.
v The normalization of a clause ., by repeated applications of simplification,
is represented by a contraction hyperarc (v1 , ..., vn ; w; u), where v1 , ..., vn are
labelled by the equations applied as simplifiers, w by ., u by its normal form .$,
and .o.$.
For contraction inference rules that merely delete clauses, we assume that there
is a dummy clause true, such that trueO. for all ., and a vertex T in the search
graph labelled by true. Deletion of a clause is represented as replacement by true,
meaning that a clause is deleted because it is trivially true in the context of the
other clauses in the set:
v The subsumption of a clause . by another clause  is represented by the
hyperarc (v; w; T), where l(v)= and l(w)=.. The right picture in Fig. 1 is an
example. If  and . are variants, the hyperarc has the form (v; v; T), because
variants are associated to the same vertex. The same representation applies to
functional subsumption of equations [22].
v The deletion of a tautology . is visualized as a hyperarc (&; v; T), which can
be abbreviated as (v; T), where v is the vertex of .. Deletion of a trivial equation
s&s is represented in the same way.
Figure 2 shows how inference hyperarcs of different types combine in a graph.
3.2. Representation of Deletions: The Marking Function
The representation of contraction inferences by contraction hyperarcs captures
the capability of contraction rules to generate new clauses, e.g., by simplification,
and allows us to have a uniform representation of all the inferences. It is not
sufficient, however, to represent contraction, because only clauses that have been
generated can be deleted, and only those deletions that are actually selected by the
search plan need to be represented. In other words, the representation of contraction
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FIG. 2. The combination of the hyperarcs of Fig. 1 in a graph.
cannot be separated from the representation of the selection of inferences by the
search plan.
In order to represent the selection of inferences by the search plan, we enrich the
search graph with a marking: a marking of arcs and a marking of vertices. The
marking of an arc tells how many times the inference represented by the arc has
been executed. The marking of a vertex represents its status: the status of a vertex
in the search graph is positive, if its clause has been generated and is being kept,
is 0 if it has not been generated, and is negative if it has been generated and then
deleted. Generations and deletions of clauses will be represented by setting the
statuses of their vertices accordingly. Since different variants of a clause may be
generated during a derivation, we also use the marking to indicate the number of
multiple occurrences:
Definition 3.4. A marked search-graph (V, E, l, h, s, c) is given by
v a search graph (V, E, l, h),
v a vertex-marking function s: V  Z from vertices to integers, defined as
follows:
m if m variants (m>0) of l(v) are present,
s(v)={&1 if all variants of l(v) have been deleted,0 otherwise.
v an arc-marking function c: E  Z+ from hyperarcs to non-negative integers,
defined by: c(e)=n if the inference of arc e has been executed n times.
The search graph represents the static structure of all the possible inferences in
the search space. Such structure depends only on the logic of the problem, i.e., the
input clauses and the inference rules. The marking, on the other hand, represents
the dynamic behaviour of the search space. While expansion inference rules can be
represented by using only the static structure, both components of the representation
are necessary for the proper representation of contraction.
3.3. The Evolution of the Search Space during the Derivation
The marking allows us to represent a derivation on the search graph. We define
first the preconditions for the execution of an inference step:
182 BONACINA AND HSIANG
Definition 3.5. Given a marked search-graph (V, E, l, h, s, c), the inference
step represented by the hyperarc (v1 , ..., vn ; vn+1 ; vn+2) # E is enabled, if s(vj)>0 for
all jn+1, and s(vn+1)>1 if vn+1 # [v1 , ..., vn].
The post-conditions of the execution of an inference step are the following:
Definition 3.6. Given a marked search-graph (V, E, l, h, s, c), the successor
marking induced by the execution of an enabled hyperarc e=(v1 , ..., vn ; vn+1 ; vn+2)
in E is given by:
v the successor vertex-marking function succe(s) defined as:
s(v)&1 if v=vn+1 and s(v)>1
&1 if v=vn+1 and s(v)=1
succe(s)(v)={1 if v=vn+2 and s(v)=&1s(v)+1 if v=vn+2 and s(v)0
s(v) otherwise.
v the successor arc-marking function succe(c) defined as:
succe(c)(a)={c(a)+1c(a)
if a=e,
otherwise.
An actual derivation can be reproduced by starting from the marking associated
with the initial state and modifying the marking according to the derivation steps. In
other words, changes in the marking on the search graph mirror actual generations
and deletions of clauses. Since the steps in the derivation are chosen by the search
plan 7, the corresponding transformations of the marking of the search graph
represent the effect of the search plan on the search graph:
Definition 3.7. Let S be a theorem-proving problem and C=(I, 7) be a
theorem-proving strategy. Given the search graph G(SI*)=(V, E, l, h), the succession
of markings associated to the derivation S0 VC S1 VC } } } VC S i VC } } } , where
S0=S, is the succession [(si , ci)] i0 such that:
v for all e # E, c0(e)=0; for all v # V, s0(v)=1 if clause .=l(v) is in S0 ,
s0(v)=0 otherwise, and
v for all i0, if e is the enabled hyperarc selected by 7 at stage i, then
si+1=succe(s i) and c i+1=succe(ci).
It follows that each state Si of a derivation has its associated search graph
Gi=(V, E, l, h, si , ci), and S i is exactly the multiset of clauses with positive marking
in Gi . If we consider only these clauses, we obtain a subgraph:
Definition 3.8. Given a marked search-graph G=(V, E, l, h, s, c), the active
part of the search space in G is the marked search-graph G+=(V+, E+, l, h, s, c),
where V+=[v | v # V, s(v)>0] and E+ is the restriction of E to V+.
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If we consider all the clauses with non-zero marking, we obtain the portion of the
search space generated by the strategy:
Definition 3.9. Given a marked search-graph G=(V, E, l, h, s, c), the generated
search space in G is the marked search-graph G*=(V*, E*, l, h, s, c), where
V*=[v | v # V, s(v){0] and E* is the restriction of E to V*.
Then, Gi* is the search space generated by a strategy C up to stage i. For
simplicity, we shall use Gi* also to denote the multiset of clauses with non-zero marking
in Gi . We remark that Gi* is finite for all i0, regardless of whether the derivation
terminates. If the derivation halts at some stage k, the search space generated up
to stage k is the search space generated by the strategy during the entire derivation.
3.4. Discussion and Comparison with Related Work
In this section we compare our representation of the search space with other
related notions. Before we proceed, we need to outline some of the better known
classical approaches.
In artificial intelligence, search space is usually described by a graph of states. The
nodes are labelled by elements in States, where the root is labelled by the initial
state and a node with label S has a child with label S$, if S$ can be derived from
S by one application of an inference rule in I. In this framework, a path, or I-path,
represents a derivation. The nodes labelled by a successful state (such as a multiset
containing the empty clause) are successful nodes, and a path from the root to a
successful node is a successful path. Since different sequences of inference steps may
lead to the same state, this structure is usually treated as a graph, although it can
also be represented as a tree if distinct nodes are allowed to have the same label.
We called it I-tree in [14] to emphasize that its structure is determined by the
inference system. Indeed, the I-tree with root S represents all the possible derivations
by the inference system I from S. The search plan enters in the picture as the
mechanism that selects at each step the successor of the current node. The repeated
application of the search plan 7 selects an I-path in the I-tree, the unique derivation
generated by the strategy (I, 7) .
A different framework was proposed in [33], in which the search space is
represented as a tree of states. In this approach, what constitutes a state depends
on the strategy. For subgoal-reduction strategies, such as those based on model
elimination, a state is a goal clause. An arc connects two states S and S$ if the goal
clause of S$ can be derived from the goal clause of S by a subgoal-reduction step.
Thus, the search space is basically the tree of subgoals that is the typical choice for
representing search by subgoal-reduction strategies. For strategies based on
(forward) resolution, a state is a set of clauses, and there is an arc from state S to
state S$ if S$ is the union of S and all the resolvents in S. This representation has
two major problems. First, since each arc (representing an atomic action) generates
and adds all resolvents, one cannot deal with search plans which select resolvents
one at a time. Second, and for the same reason, one cannot consider contraction
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inference rules since the contractions of certain clauses may prevent some resolvents
from being generated.
As a consequence, all strategies studied in [33] are either expansion-only
strategies or subgoal-reduction strategies. Contraction is considered only after the
main analysis has been completed. Because the type of analysis is worst-case
analysis (in propositional logic), one is only interested in determining whether
contraction rules, such as subsumption and clausal simplification, may apply to the
sets of clauses used to establish the upper bounds for the expansion-only strategies.
The representation using tree of states is useful in describing global properties of
strategies. In [14], we used it to study refutational completeness of the inference
mechanism and fairness of the search plan. In [33], it is used to study the total size
of the finite search spaces of Horn propositional problems. On the other hand,
‘‘searching for paths in trees is not general enough to represent the searches needed
in automatic theorem proving’’ (quoted from [24] where it is attributed to [36]).
This assessment is even more valid for theorem proving with contraction. The tree
of states does not show the effect of contraction, because in such a representation
the effect of contraction remains hidden in the states, e.g., the sets of clauses, that
are the labels of the nodes of the tree. Thus, it does not emerge that contraction
makes the search space dynamic.
In order to capture the effects of contraction and the role of the search plan, we
use a search graph of clauses in the style of [24]. Our search graph is motivated
by [24], and is intended to further represent the behaviour of deletions by contraction.
At the first glance, one may incline to think that the deletion of a clause can
be done within the search graph representation of [24] by simply deleting its
associated vertex, all its arcs, and the portion of graph that is made disconnected
as a consequence. This naive approach fails to recognize that while the generation
of clauses by the inference system can be completely represented independently of
the search plan, the representation of contraction is intertwined with the represen-
tation of the dynamic behaviour determined by the search plan. Therefore, in our
approach we represent the generative power of the inference system by the static
structure of the search graph (including generation by contraction rules, e.g., by
simplification), and represent deletions by using the marking function.
The difficulty of representing contraction purely at the graph level is concretely
visible if one considers the case of a clause that is generated, deleted, and then
generated again as a different variant. If deletion of a clause were represented by
deleting its vertex, it would be necessary to have a distinct vertex for each variant
of a clause. This appears to be a cumbersome representation, since there are
infinitely many variants of a clause. Also, it would not capture the basic knowledge
that all variants are logically the same clause. In our approach, all variants of a
clause are associated to the same vertex, and deletions are represented by changing
the marking. In this way we capture both the logical knowledge that all variants are
the same clause and the theorem-proving knowledge that theorem provers generate
multiple variants and delete them by subsumption.
The choice of having a unique vertex for all occurrences and variants of a clause
makes our search graph different from [24] also in terms of the representation of
the generation of clauses. The search graph in [24] captured the fact that a clause
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can be derived in different ways by allowing distinct vertices to be labelled by the
same clause (or variants thereof). In our search graph, different generations of a
clause are represented by different paths to the same vertex. The representation of
inferences is modified accordingly. In [24], an inference step was represented by
a set of arcs, each arc connecting a premise to the consequence. The set of arcs
forming a step was identified as the set of arcs pointing to the consequence of the
step. If all occurrences of a clause are associated to the same vertex, it is not
possible to identify a step by its consequence, because different steps have the same
consequence. Our solution is to use hyperarcs, so that the premises of each step are
grouped together, and each step is uniquely represented by a hyperarc.
Although the main motivation for our choices is the representation of contraction,
there are other additional advantages. First, our model allows us to establish a
formal relationship between the macro-level of the I-tree and the micro-level of the
search graph: since Definition 3.7 could apply to any path in the I-tree, a marked
search-graph can be associated to any node in the I-tree. Intuitively, if one could
look at a node in the I-tree with a magnifying lense, one would see the corresponding
marked search-graph. The marked search-graph is a ‘‘blow-up’’ of a node in the
I-tree. Second, our approach appears suitable for extensions to parallel search. By
keeping all information about a clause in one vertex, it makes it easier to keep track
in the presence of several deductive processes which may generatedelete the same
clause in different ways and at different times. Structural deletions in the graph, on
the other hand, seem quite difficult in the parallel case, since a clause may be
deleted by a deductive process and kept by another.
4. MEASURES OF COMPLEXITY OF SEARCH
In this section, we define complexity measures for search in an infinite search
space.
The first issue we emphasize is that the search space in consideration is usually
infinite. Therefore the conventional measures such as the number of vertices or
maximum path length are no longer sufficient to accurately represent the behaviour
of the strategies.
A complexity measure is a pair (A, >), where A is the set of mathematical
objects that are representatives of the entities whose complexity is being measured,
and > is a well-founded ordering to compare the elements in A.
Let Gi=(V, E, l, h, si , ci) be the marked search-graph associated to stage i during
a derivation. In order to capture the complexity of the search process, one needs to
reason on two domains: the portion of the search graph that has been visited, and
the portion of the search graph that is still undiscovered. We call the former the
present, because it represents the present state of the process, and the latter the
future, because it contains all the possible continuations of the process. The present
is completely characterized by Gi itself, from which we can extract measures such
as the multiset Si of existing clauses. Multisets can be compared by the multiset
extension omul of the given well-founded ordering o on clauses. The crucial, and
difficult, point is to define complexity measures for the future. This entails two
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parts. First we need to identify metrics for the future space. Such metrics should be
related to the behaviour of the strategies that we aim at describing. Since the
purpose of a (refutational) strategy is to generate eventually the empty clause, this
metric will be a notion of distance of clauses in a search graph. The clauses in the
future will be characterized by their distance relative to the current state. This
notion of distance will be dynamic: the inference steps executed by the strategy
modify the distances of the clauses in the future. In this way we can capture the
effect of the inferences on the portion of the search graph that has not been
generated. The second part is to identify a proper finite portion of the infinite
unexplored search graph, where the behaviour of the strategies can be observed.
4.1. Dynamic Distance
A notion of distance in graphs is usually defined in terms of path length. Since
a search graph is a hypergraph, the notion of path is replaced by a notion of
ancestor-graph of a vertex v:
Definition 4.1. Let G=(V, E, l, h) be a search graph. For all v # V,
v if v has no incoming hyperarcs, the ancestor-graph of v is the graph made
of v itself.
v If e=(v1 , ..., vn ; vn+1 ; v) is a hyperarc in E and t1 , ..., tn , tn+1 are ancestor-
graphs of v1 , ..., vn , vn+1 , then the graph with root v connected by e to the
subgraphs t1 , ..., tn , tn+1 is an ancestor-graph of v. We denote it by the triple
(v; e; (t1 , ..., tn , tn+1)).
An ancestor-graph of v represents a sequence of inferences, or a generation-path,
that generates its associated clause . from the input clauses. The clauses associated
to the vertices of an ancestor-graph t of . are its ancestors on the generation-path
represented by t. Since the ancestor-graph of a clause in a search graph is not
unique, we use atG(v) (or atG(.)) to denote the set of the ancestor-graphs of v
in G.
Given Gi=(V, E, l, h, si , ci), a clause . that has not been generated, and an
ancestor-graph t of ., we are interested in measuring the distance that has been
covered and the distance that has not been covered, to reach . on the generation-
path represented by t. The global distance to . will be the sum of these two distances.
As a first approximation, the distance that has not been covered is given by the
number of clauses in t that have not been generated (zero marking). Dually, the
distance that has been covered is given by the number of clauses in t that have been
generated (non-zero marking). We use p-distance for the ‘‘distance that has been
covered,’’ f -distance for the ‘‘distance that has not been covered,’’ and g-distance for
the ‘‘global distance.’’ In order to define these notions accurately, we need to
distinguish those ancestors that are relevant to the generation of . in the current
marking:
Definition 4.2. Let G=(V, E, l, h, s, c) be a marked search-graph, v be a
vertex in V such that l(v)=., and t=(v; e; (t1 , ..., tn , tn+1)) be an ancestor-graph
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of v, where e=(v1 , ..., vn ; vn+1; v). Then a vertex w # t, w{v, is relevant to v
in t if
v either w # [v1 , ..., vn , vn+1] and c(e)=0,
v or w is relevant to vi in ti for some i, 1in+1.
We denote by RevG(t) the set of relevant vertices of t in G. Figures 3 and 4 give
a few examples of ancestor-graphs, showing how the execution of inference steps
affects the markings and the relevance of ancestors. Boldface numbers attached to
clauses and hyperarcs respectively represent their markings.
Example 4.1. The left-hand side of Fig. 3 shows the ancestor-graph t1 of
D6 Z. Initially all ancestors are relevant. If the resolution arc that generates Q 6 R
is executed, the marking is modified as shown in the right-hand side. After the step,
the ancestors cP 6 Q and P 6 R are no longer relevant.
Example 4.2. The left-hand side of Fig. 4 contains two ancestor-graphs, t2 of
f (e, f (e, y))& f (e, y) and t3 of f (g(g(x)), y)& f (x, y). The ancestor-graph t2 of
f (e, f (e, y))& f (e, y) includes, from the bottom up, f (e, f (e, y))& f (e, y), g(e)&e
and f (g(x), f (x, y))& f (e, y). The ancestor-graph t3 of f (g(g(x)), y)& f (x, y)
includes, from the bottom up, f ( g( g(x)), y) & f (x, y), f ( g(x), f (x, y )) & y,
f(g(x), f (x, y))& f (e, y) and f (e, x)&x. Equation f (g(g(x)), y)& f (x, y) is generated
by superposing f (g(x), f (x, y))& y into itself. Initially all ancestors are relevant in
both graphs. On the right we have the two ancestor-graphs after the step that
simplifies f (g(x), f (x, y))& f (e, y) to f (g(x), f (x, y))& y using f (e, x)&x is
executed. Note that the ancestors f (g(x), f (x, y))& f (e, y) and f (e, x)&x are no
longer relevant to f (g(g(x)), y)& f (x, y).
We can now define the distance of a clause . on an ancestor-graph t # atG(.).
The f-distance will be given by the number of ancestors in t that have not been
generated. Note that all such ancestors are relevant, because if w is an ancestor
of v and s(w)=0, the arc connecting w to v cannot have been executed. If some
relevant ancestor of . in t is deleted, . is not reachable via t and therefore the
f-distance of . on t is infinite. The distance of the deleted clause itself obviously also
becomes infinite:
Definition 4.3. Given a marked search-graph G=(V, E, l, h, s, c) and a clause
., for all t # atG(.), we define:
FIG. 3. Ancestor-graph t1 before and after the generation of Q 6 R.
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FIG. 4. Ancestor-graphs t2 and t3 before and after the simplification of f (g(x), f (x, y))& f (e, y).
v The p-distance of . on t is pdistG(t)=|[w | w # t, s(w){0]|.
v The f-distance of . on t is
fdistG(t)={|[w | w # t, s(w)=0]|
if s(.)<0 or _w # RevG(t), s(w)<0,
otherwise.
v The g-distance of . on t is gdistG(t)= pdistG(t)+ fdistG(t).
The f-distance of . in G is fdistG(.)=min[ fdistG(t) | t # atG(.)]. The g-distance of
. in G is gdistG(.)=min[gdistG(t) | t # atG(.)].
This notion of distance is dynamic because it depends on the marking, and there-
fore it evolves with the marking during a derivation. The p-distance measures the
portion of an ancestor-graph that has been visited. The f-distance measures
reachability. If the f-distance of a clause . is infinite on all its ancestor-graphs, then
fdistG(.)=, and . is unreachable. If fdistG(.) is finite, then . is reachable.
A positive f-distance measures the distance between the current state and .. In
particular, if 0< fdistG(t)<, fdistG(t) measures the amount of work that needs to
be done to reach . from the current state by traversing the path t. For instance, if .
is a candidate for generation at the next step, its f-distance is 1 on at least one
ancestor-graph t of .. This means that all ancestors of . in t have already been
generated and the hyperarc that generates . in t is enabled. If a clause . has been
generated (reached), then fdistG(.)=0. Remark that a generated clause may have
positive or even infinite f-distance on ancestor-graphs other than the one traversed
to reach it. Also, a deleted clause may be generated again, making its f-distance and
those of its descendants finite again. The g-distance keeps into account both
the work that has been already done and the work that needs to be done. If the
f-distance becomes infinite because of deletions of needed ancestors, the g-distance
also becomes infinite.
We conclude this section by showing how the above definitions apply to several
examples.
Example 4.3. In the left-hand side of Fig. 3 the p-distance of D 6 Z is 4 and the
f-distance is 3. After Q 6 R is generated, the p-distance becomes 5 and the f-distance
becomes 2. This signifies that one step has been made towards reaching D 6 Z. If
cP 6 Q is deleted later, the distance to D 6 Z is unaffected, because cP 6 Q is
not relevant after the generation of Q 6 R. This reflects the fact that cP 6 Q is no
longer needed to reach D 6 Z if Q6 R has been generated. If we consider Q 6 R
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itself, we have that its p-distance is 2 and its f-distance is 1 in the left-hand side of
Fig. 3. After it is generated, its p-distance is 3 and its f-distance is 0.
Example 4.4. The p-distance and f-distance of f (g(g(x)), y)& f (x, y) on ancestor-
graph t3 in Fig. 4 were originally both equal to 2. After the simplification step is executed,
the p-distance becomes 3 and the f-distance becomes 1. Note that the f-distance does not
become infinite, because f (g(x), f (x, y))& f (e, y) is not relevant after the simplification
step. This reflects the fact that the deletion of f (g(x), f (x, y))& f (e, y) does not prevent
the generation of f (g(g(x)), y)& f (x, y) on this path. On the contrary, it is part of a step
towards the generation of f (g(g(x)), y)& f (x, y). On the other hand, the f-distance of
f(e, f (e, y))& f (e, y) on ancestor-graph t2 was originally 1, but it becomes infinite after
f(g(x), f (x, y))& f (e, y) is deleted by simplification.
Example 4.5. The leftmost picture of Fig. 5 contains two ancestor graphs, t4
and t5 , of C 6 D. In t4 , a&b paramodulates into P(a) 6 C to generate P(b) 6 C,
which then resolves with cP(b) 6 D to generate C 6 D. In t5 , a&b simplifies
P(a) 6 C to P(b) 6 C (assuming aob), which then resolves with cP(b) 6 D to
generate C 6 D. Such a graph may occur in the search space of an inference system
that features both paramodulation and simplification. The f-distance of C 6 D is 2
on both t4 and t5 . If the paramodulation step in t4 is performed, the situation
evolves as shown in Fig. 5. The f-distance of C6 D reduces to 1 on both ancestor-
graphs. On the other hand, if we execute first the simplification step in t5 , the situation
evolves as shown in Fig. 6. The f-distance of C 6 D on t5 reduces to 1, but the
f-distance of C 6 D on t4 becomes infinite, because the marking of P(a) 6 C is &1
and P(a) 6 C is relevant. This expresses the fact that the deletion of P(a) 6 C
makes the paramodulation step impossible. The f-distance to C 6 D in the graph is
1 (the minimum between 1 and ) as C6 D is only one step away.
Example 4.6. Similar considerations apply to clause P(b) 6 C itself in Figs. 5
and 6. Initially, P(b) 6 C has f-distance 1 in both t4 and t5 . If the paramodulation
step is executed, the f-distance of P(b) 6 C reduces to 0 in both t4 and t5 . If the
simplification step is executed later, the marking of P(b) 6 C becomes 2 (two
variants present) and its f-distance remains 0. On the other hand, if the simplification
step is executed first, the f-distance of P(b) 6 C reduces to 0 in t5 , but it is infinite
in t4 . This expresses the fact that a second variant of P(b) 6 C cannot be generated
by the paramodulation step in t4 .
FIG. 5. From left to right, ancestor-graphs t4 and t5 of C 6D prior to any step, t4 if the para-
modulation step is selected, t5 if the paramodulation step is selected.
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FIG. 6. From left to right, ancestor-graphs t4 and t5 of C 6 D prior to any step, t4 if the simplification
step is selected, t5 if the simplification step is selected.
Example 4.7. Figure 7 shows on the right ancestor-graphs t6 and t7 of F. The
two ancestor-graphs differ in that t6 includes the resolution step generating B from
cA 6 B and A, whereas t7 includes the resolution step generating B from cE 6 B
and E. Starting from the indicated marking, if the resolution step generating B from
cA 6 B and A is executed, we have the situation shown in Fig. 7. The f-distance
of F reduces from 2 to 1 on both ancestor-graphs. If A is later deleted, the f-distance
of F on t6 is unaffected. On the other hand, if E is later deleted, the f-distance of
F on t7 becomes infinite. Of course, the f-distance of F in the graph remains 1 (the
minimum between 1 and ). The situation is symmetric if the other resolution step
is executed first as shown in Fig. 8.
4.2. The Bounded Search Spaces
We now consider the portion of search graph that contains all the clauses whose
distance is within a certain bound. Note that although the entire search graph is
infinite, the search graph within bounded distance is finite. In other words, the notion
of distance allows us to ‘‘slice’’ the infinite search graph into finite layers:
Definition 4.4. Given a marked search-graph G=(V, E, l, h, s, c), for all j>0,
the bounded search space within distance j is the multiset of clauses
space(G, j)= :
v # V, v{T
mulG(v, j) } l(v)
where mulG(v, j)=|[t | t # atG(v), 0< gdistG(t) j]|.
FIG. 7. From left to right, ancestor-graphs t6 and t7 of F prior to any step, t6 if resolution of
cA 6 B and A is selected, t7 if resolution of cA 6 B and A is selected.
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FIG. 8. From left to right, ancestor-graphs t6 and t7 of F prior to any step, t6 if resolution of
cE 6 B and E is selected, t7 if resolution of cE 6B and E is selected.
For the ease of expression, we use the representation of multisets as polynomials,
with the multiplicities as coefficients. The multiplicity mulG(v, j) of .=l(v) is the
number of ancestor-graphs of . with g-distance not greater than j in the current
marked graph. It follows that . appears in space(G, j), i.e., mulG(., j)>0, if and
only if gdistG(.) j. If gdistG(.)> j, then mulG(., j)=0 and . does not appear in
space(G, j). Therefore, space(G, j) is the finite portion of search space that contains
all the clauses reachable in at most j steps.
The notion of bounded search space allows us to analyze the complexity of search
by transforming the problem of search in an infinite search space into the problem of
search in an infinite succession of finite search spaces [space(Gi , j)]i0, j>0. The
problem of comparing the infinite search spaces of different theorem-proving
strategies becomes the problem of comparing their bounded search spaces.
To summarize, complexity measures for theorem proving include the multisets of
existing clauses, ordered by the multiset extension omul , and the bounded search
spaces, also ordered by omul . In the next section we study the effects of inferences
on these measures.
5. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF INFERENCES ON
THE COMPLEXITY MEASURES
In this section we analyze the effects of inferences on the present and the future
at any stage of a derivation. We assume throughout the section that C=(I, 7) is
a strategy, S is a theorem-proving problem, S0 VC S1 VC } } } VC Si VC } } } is the
derivation by C on input S0=S, G is the underlying search graph G(SI*) and Gi
is the marked search-graph associated to stage i of the derivation. Since the results
of this section will be applied in Section 6 to the comparison of contraction-based
strategies, we assume that 7 is an eager-contraction search plan.
5.1. The Effects of Inferences on the Present
We start by showing that expansion steps make the multiset of present clauses
greater, whereas contraction steps make it smaller:
Theorem 5.1. Given a well-founded ordering on clauses o , for all inference steps
Si Vf Si+1,
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v Si+1 omul S i , if f is an expansion rule,
v Si+1 Omul S i , if f is a contraction rule with respect to o .
Proof. If f is an expansion rule, S i+1=Si _ [.1 , ..., .n] where .1 , ..., .n are the
clauses generated by the step: hence S i+1 omul Si . If f is a contraction rule,
Si+1=S i&[1 , ..., m] _ [.1 , ..., .n] where .1 , ..., .n are generated and 1 , ..., m
deleted by the step. Because f is a contraction rule with respect to o , for all i,
1in, there exists a j, 1 jm, such that j o.i . It follows that
Si+1 Omul Si . K
This proof applies to all expansion steps, regardless of whether they generate
‘‘new’’ clauses or variants of already existing clauses, because in either case the
multiplicity of the generated clause in the multiset is incremented. Similarly, it applies
to all contraction steps, including both replacement and deletion, since deletion is
replacement by true (see Section 3.1).
In a derivation made only of expansion steps the multiset of present clauses is
monotonically increasing. The active part of the search space and the generated
search space coincide (i.e., G+i =Gi* for all i0), because no clause is ever deleted.
This expresses the fact that solving a problem by pure expansion consists in
expanding the generated portion of the search space until it includes the empty
clause. In a derivation with contraction instead, the multiset of present clauses
oscillates non-monotonically.
5.2. The Effects of Inferences on the Future
The most important effect of inferences on the future is that the deletion of a
clause  affects not only , but also every clause . that has  as ancestor in an
ancestor-graph t, because the distance of . on t becomes infinite. As a consequence,
some clauses may become unreachable. We first give a lemma which expresses an
important property of eager contraction: once a clause is deemed redundant, it will
not be used for expansion. We recall that in a strategy C, we use Ie for its set of
expansion inference rules and IR for its set of contraction inference rules.
Lemma 5.1. Let C=(Ie _ IR , 7) be a contraction-based strategy and S0 VC
S1 VC } } } Si VC } } } be a derivation by C. For all clauses ., if si (.)<0 and
sj (.)>0 for some 0<i< j, then there exists a k, k> j, such that sk(.)<0, and .
is not selected as premise of an expansion step at any stage h, jhk.
Proof. If si (.)<0, it means that . has been deleted by contraction. Thus
. # R(Si), and by monotonicity of redundancy, . # R(Sn) for all n>i. If sj (.)>0
for some j>i, it means that . is generated again through some other path. Because
. is still redundant and the search plan 7 is an eager-contraction plan, a step that
deletes . will be selected, so that sk(.)<0 for some k> j. Furthermore, since 7 is
an eager-contraction plan, it will not select any expansion step as long as contraction
rules are applicable. Therefore, . will not be selected as premise of an expansion
step at any stage between j and k. K
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The consequence of this lemma is that, in a strategy with eager contraction, we
may ignore inferences that regenerate a clause which had been already deleted. Such
a clause will be deleted before an expansion step is performed, therefore the impact
of its regeneration on the reachability of other clauses is null. More formally, this
lemma justifies the following approximation that we make in the rest of the paper:
if a distance fdistGi (t) is infinite, then fdistGj (t) can be regarded as infinite for all
j>i.
We start with the case of an (expansion) inference step that generates a clause .
All clauses that were reachable before generating , are still reachable afterwards.
Thus, the bounded search spaces are unchanged:
Theorem 5.2. If Si V Si+1 generates a clause , then \j>0, space(Gi , j)=
space(Gi+1 , j).
Proof. We distinguish two cases based on the marking of .
1. If si ()>0, Si V Si+1 generates a new variant of a clause that was already
present. The marking of  remains positive (si+1()>0), so that the distance of no
clause is affected, and \j>0, space(Gi , j)=space(Gi+1 , j).
2. If si ()=0, the marking of  goes from 0 to 1. For all ancestor-graphs t
in G, if   t, then gdistGi+1(t)= gdistGi (t). If  # t, then pdistGi+1(t)= pdistGi (t)+1,
fdistGi+1(t)= fdistGi (t)&1 and gdistGi+1(t)= gdistGi (t). It follows that for all clauses
the multiplicities in the bounded search spaces remain the same: \j>0, space(Gi , j)=
space(Gi+1 , j). K
In particular, for all those clauses that have  as ancestor in an ancestor-graph
of minimum f-distance, the f-distance in the graph decreases, i.e., fdistGi+1(.)=
fdistGi (.)&1. The activity of an expansion step consists only in generating clauses.
By the above theorem, expansion inferences do not change the bounded search
spaces. This reflects the fact that expansion inferences consist in visiting the search
space, without modifying it.
A contraction step deletes a clause  or replaces it by a clause $. Since pure
deletion is equivalent to replacing the deleted clause by true, we study these two
cases together. The deletion of  affects those clauses that have  as relevant
ancestor. We denote this set by Di (): Di ()=[. | _t # atG(.) such that  #
RevGi (t)]. If  is deleted at stage i, it has negative marking at stage i+1. Therefore
we are interested in the clauses in Di+1(). The distances of these clauses on the
ancestor-graphs that include  become infinite. For all bounded search spaces
whose bound is sufficiently deep to include these ancestor-graphs, the multiplicity
of the descendants of  decreases. When the multiplicity becomes 0, clauses that are
in space(Gi , j) are no longer in space(Gi+1 , j). Thus, the bounded search spaces are
contracted:
Theorem 5.3. If Si V Si+1 replaces a clause  by $, then \j>0, space(Gi+1 , j)
Pmul space(Gi , j). If si ()=1 and D i+1(){< then _k>0, \jk, space(Gi+1 , j)
Omul space(Gi , j).
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Proof. By Theorem 5.2, the generation of $ has no effect on the bounded
search spaces. We distinguish two cases based on the marking of .
1. If si ()>1, Si V Si+1 deletes (e.g., by subsumption) a clause  such that
at least another variant of  is left in Si+1 . The marking of  remains positive
(si+1()>0), so that the distance of no clause is affected, and \j>0, space(Gi , j)=
space(Gi+1 , j).
2. If si ()=1, then si+1()=&1. The f-distance of  becomes infinite. Thus,
 # space(Gi , j) for all j gdistGi (), but   space(Gi+1 , j) for any j. For all other
clauses (including $ and its descendants), if .  Di+1(), its distance, and therefore
its multiplicities in the bounded search spaces, remains the same. If . # Di+1(),
there exist some t # atG(.) such that fdistGi (t) is finite, whereas fdistGi+1(t)=,
because  has been deleted.5 It follows that gdistGi (t) is finite and gdistGi+1(t)=.
Graph t contributes one unit to the multiplicity of . in space(Gi , j) for all j
gdistGi (t), but it does not contribute to the multiplicity of . in space(Gi+1 , j) for
any j. Therefore, for all j gdistGi (t), mulGi+1(., j)<mulGi (., j). Since there may be
more than one ancestor-graph of . where  is relevant, let p(.)=min[ j | _t # atG(.),
j= gdistGi (t), gdistGi+1(t)=]. In other words, p(.) is the minimum bound that is
deep enough to register a change in the multiplicity of .. It follows that for all
j p(.), mulGi+1(., j)<mulGi (., j), and for all j< p(.), mulGi+1(., j)=mulGi (., j).
In summary, since for all clauses the multiplicity either reduces or remains the
same, we have \j>0, space(Gi+1 , j)Pmul space(Gi , j). Furthermore, let h=
min[ p(.) | . # Di+1()] and k=min(h, gdistGi ()). Then \jk, space(Gi+1 , j)
Omul space(Gi , j). K
For those clauses in D i+1() that have  as relevant ancestor in all the
ancestor-graphs of minimum f-distance, the f-distance in the graph grows when  is
contracted (i.e., fdistGi+1(.)> fdistGi (.)). The g-distance in the graph may grow
accordingly: gdistGi+1(.) gdistGi (.). If a clause in Di+1(.) has  as a relevant
ancestor in all of its ancestor-graphs, then its f-distance (and g-distance) becomes
infinite when  is contracted. In other words, such a clause becomes unreachable.
Thus, contraction prunes the future search space.
In practice, the pruning effect of contraction is usually most visible on non-trivial
problems. For reasons of space, we give an example with a simple set of clauses.
Example 5.1. We consider the search graph generated from S0=[P 6 Q,
cP 6 Q, P 6 cQ, cP 6 cQ] by resolution and subsumption. Figure 9 shows
the initial state of the fragment of the graph corresponding to space(G0 , 3), with,
in addition, the clause true. We have space(G0 , 3)=[P 6 Q, cP 6 Q, P 6 cQ,
cP 6 cQ, Q, P, cP, Q 6 cQ, Q6 cQ, P 6 cP, P 6cP, cQ]. If resolution
of P 6 Q and cP 6 Q is selected, Q is generated: S1=[P 6 Q, cP 6 Q, P 6 cQ,
cP 6 cQ, Q] and space(G1 , 3)=space(G0 , 3). Then, if Q subsumes P 6 Q, both
the multiset of present clauses and the bounded search spaces are contracted:
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5 In particular, $ may be in D i+1() if it is descendant of  through some arc other than the contrac-
tion step that has been executed. The same holds for any descendant of $.
FIG. 9. A fragment of the search graph for [P 6Q, cP6 Q, P 6 cQ, cP 6 cQ] prior to any step.
S2=[cP 6 Q, P 6 cQ, cP 6 cQ, Q] and space(G2 , 3)=[cP 6 Q, P 6 cQ,
cP 6 cQ, Q, cP, Q6 cQ, P 6 cP, cQ]. In the latter, P 6 Q is removed
because it is deleted, and P is removed because its multiplicity has reduced from 1
to 0: the distance of P on the ancestor-graph that generates P from P 6 Q has
become infinite. For the same reason, the multiplicity of Q6 cQ and P 6 cP has
reduced from 2 to 1. Next, if Q subsumes also cP 6 Q, the multiplicity of cP,
Q6 cQ and P 6 cP reduces from 1 to 0: S3=[P 6 cQ, cP 6 cQ, Q] and
space(G3 , 3)=[P 6 cQ, cP 6 cQ, Q, cQ]. Clauses Q 6 cQ and P 6 cP have
become unreachable. On the other hand, P and cP are still reachable: if we take
a larger bound and consider space(G3 , 5), we find P and cP in space(G3 , 5),
because of the ancestor-graphs that generate them from Q and P 6 cQ, and from
Q and cP 6 cQ, respectively. Figure 10 shows how the state of the search graph
in Fig. 9 has been modified by these inferences.
FIG. 10. The fragment of search graph of Fig. 9 after one resolution step and two subsumption
steps.
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6. COMPARISON OF STRATEGIES
In this section we apply our approach for the measurement of search complexity
to the comparison of strategies. Theorem-proving strategies may differ in many
ways. As a first cut, one may distinguish between comparing strategies that have the
same inference system and different search plans, and comparing strategies that
have the same search plan and different inference systems. In this paper, we
consider an instance of the second type of problem: we compare strategies that have
the same search plan and differ solely in the contraction component of the inference
system. Namely, we shall assume that one strategy has more contraction power
than the other.
Comparing two strategies C1=(I1 , 7) and C2=(I2 , 7) with different inference
systems poses the problem that given an input set of clauses S, the search spaces
G1=G(S*I1) and G
2=G(S*I2) are different in general. This is reflected by the
complexity measure in that space(G10 , j) and space(G
2
0 , j) are different. Therefore, we
cannot compare absolute values of the complexity measures for the two strategies.
We need to compare them relative to the different search spaces G(S*I1) and G(S*I2).
In other words, we need to compare variations of the complexity measures rather
than absolute values. For this purpose, we introduce the following 2 notation to
represent the variation in the bounded search spaces:
2space(Gi , j)= :
v # V, v{T
2mulGi (v, j) } l(v),
where 2mulGi (v, j)=mulG0(v, j)&mulGi (v, j), and Gi=(V, E, l, h, si , ci) is the
marked search-graph associated to stage i during a derivation. Since we proved in
Section 5.2 that all inferences either leave unaffected or decrease the multiplicities of
clauses in the bounded search spaces, it follows that 2mulGi (v, j)0.
Then, we restrict our attention to the case where the search spaces G(S*I1) and
G(S*I2) contain the same clauses. This is expressed by requiring that the inference
systems I1 and I2 are equipollent:
Definition 6.1. Two inference systems I1 and I2 are equipollent if S*I1=S*I2 for
all theorem-proving problem S.
Equipollence means that the two systems have equivalent generation power. If I1
and I2 are equipollent, then G(S*I1) and G(S*I2) contain the same clauses, although
they have different structure in general.
We can now focus on a specific instance of the comparison problem. Let C1=
(I1 , 7) and C2=(I2 , 7) with I1=Ie _ IR1 and I2=Ie _ IR2 , be two complete,
contraction-based strategies with the same eager-contraction search plan 7. We
assume that the two strategies have the same set of expansion rules Ie , that I1 , I2
and Ie are equipollent, and that for all sets of clauses S, R1(S)R2(S). In other
words, the redundancy criterion of C2 is more powerful than the redundancy
criterion of C1 . In particular, we assume that this condition is satisfied because
IR1 IR2 . It follows that I1 I2 . We assume further that Ie is refutationally
complete with redundancy criterion R2 (and therefore also with R1), so that it is
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sufficient that 7 is uniformly fair with respect to Ie and R2 (and with respect to Ie
and R1 ; see Section 2.2).
The following results compare the derivations generated by the two strategies C1
and C2 applied to the same problem S. We denote by S 10 VC1 } } } VC1 S
1
i VC1 } } }
and S 20 VC2 } } } VC2 S
2
i VC2 } } } , where S
1
0=S
2
0=S, the derivations generated by C1
and C2 , respectively. We use G1 for G(S*I1), G
2 for G(S*I2), G
1
i for the marked search-
graph associated to S 1i and G
2
k for the marked search-graph associated to S
2
k . The
search graphs G1 and G2 are different because G2 may contain more contraction
hyperarcs.
The first lemma says that whatever is generated by one strategy is either
generated or redundant for the other. This property is a consequence of uniform
fairness and the equipollence of I1 , I2 and Ie :
Lemma 6.1. For all j0 and for all clauses . # S 1j , there exists a k0 such that
. # S 2k or . # R2(S
2
k). Symmetrically, for all k0 and for all clauses . # S
2
k , there
exists a j0 such that . # S 1j or . # R1(S
1
j ).
Proof. If . is generated by C1 , then, since S*I1=S*I2=S*Ie , it can be generated by
expansion by C2 . If . # Ie(S 2&R2(S
2
)), then it will be generated in the derivation
by C2 (. # S 2k) by uniform fairness of 7 with respect to Ie and R2 . Otherwise, . can
be generated only by using clauses that are R2-redundant or non-persistent, hence
R2 -redundant, in the derivation by C2 . Thus, . itself is R2-redundant (. # R2(S 2k)).
The proof is the same for the symmetrical statement. K
The difference between the two strategies is made by the redundancy criteria. The
second lemma shows that whatever is redundant for C1 is redundant for C2 . The
proof uses the hypothesis that R1(S)R2(S) for all S, so that it does not hold in
the opposite direction:
Lemma 6.2. For all j0 and for all clauses . # R1(S 1j ), there exists a k0 such
that . # R2(S 2k).
Proof. Let [1 , ..., m]S 1j be the smallest subset of clauses such that . #
R1([1 , ..., m]). By Lemma 6.1, for all i, 1im, there exists a k i such that
i # S 2ki _ R2(S
2
ki
). Because all clauses deleted by C2 are redundant with respect to
R2 , and R2 is monotonic (R2(S0)R2(S1)R2(S2) } } } ), if there exists a k such
that  # S 2k _ R2(S
2
k), then for all h>k,  # S
2
h _ R2(S
2
h). Thus, if we take k=
max[ki | 1im], we have  i # S 2k _ R2(S
2
k) for all i, 1im. The hypothesis
that for all S, R1(S)R2(S), and . # R1([1 , ..., m]), imply . # R2([1 , ..., m]),
and hence . # R2(S 2k _ R2(S
2
k)). Since redundant clauses are irrelevant to establish
other redundancies (Property 2 in Definition 2.3 of redundancy criterion), it follows
that . # R2(S 2k). K
On the other hand, clauses that are redundant for C2 (and therefore are not
generated or deleted after generation), may not be redundant for C1 (and therefore
are persistent if generated), because C2 has a more powerful redundancy criterion.
The consequence of the difference in the redundancy criteria is that C2 prunes the
search graph at least as much as C1 , as shown by the following two lemmas:
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Lemma 6.3. For all i0, for all clauses . in G1, if s1i (.)=&1, there exists a
k0 such that either s2k(.)=&1, or s
2
k(.)=0 and fdistG2k(.)=.
Proof. Since the two strategies have equipollent inference systems, . is also in
G2. If s1i (.)=&1, it means that . has been deleted by C1 . Since deleted clauses are
redundant, . # R1(S 1i ). By Lemma 6.2, there exists an h0 such that . # R2(S
2
h).
Let h be the smallest such index. By monotonicity of R2 , . # R2(S 2j ) for all jh.
If C2 generates . at some stage (smaller or greater than h is irrelevant), there exists
a jh such that . # S 2j & R2(S
2
j ). Then . can be deleted by a contraction rule in
IR2 . Since 7 is an eager-contraction search plan, there exists a k> j such that
s2k(.)=&1. If C2 does not generate ., since C2 is uniformly fair, it means that .
is made unreachable by deleting other clauses, that is, relevant ancestors on all its
ancestor-graphs: there exists a k0 such that s2k(.)=0 and fdistG2k(.)=. K
Lemma 6.4. For all i0, for all clauses . in G1 and for all ancestor-graphs
t # atG1(.), if fdistGi1 (t)=, there exists a k0 such that fdistG2k(t)=.
Proof. Since the two strategies have equipollent inference systems, . is also in
G2. Because I1 I2 , t is an ancestor-graph of . also in G2: t # atG2(.). If
fdistGi1(t)=, either s
1
i (.)=&1 or there is a relevant ancestor  of . in t such
that s1i ()=&1. In the first case, we apply Lemma 6.3 to . itself: there exists a
k0 such that either s2k(.)=&1, or s
2
k(.)=0 and fdistG2k(.)=. It follows that
fdistG2k(.)= and, in particular, fdistG2k(t)=. In the second case, we apply
Lemma 6.3 to the ancestor : there exists a k0 such that either s2k()=&1, or
s2k()=0 and fdistG2k()=.
v If s2k()=&1, since we know that C1 deletes  when it is relevant to . in
t, and the two strategies have the same eager-contraction search plan, also C2
deletes  when it is relevant to . in t. It follows that fdistG2k(t)=.
v If s2k()=0 and fdistG2k()=, for all t$ # atG2() there exists a relevant
ancestor $ # RevG2k(t$) such that s
2
k($)=&1. By transitivity of the ancestorship
relation, at least one of these ancestors $ of  is an ancestor of . in t. (Equiv-
alently, at least one of the ancestor-graphs t$ # atG2() is a subgraph of t). Since
s2k()=0,  is relevant to .. Since $ is relevant to  and  is relevant to ., it
follows that $ is relevant to .. Thus, $ # RevG2k(t) and fdistG2k(t)=. K
By using these lemmas, the next theorem shows that C2 may contract the bounded
search spaces more than C1 :
Theorem 6.1. For all i0, _k0, such that \j>0, 2space(G2k , j)pmul
2space(G1i , j).
Proof. By Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4, C2 may prune by contraction the ancestor-
graphs of any clause . at least as much as C1 . By Theorem 5.3, pruning the
ancestor-graphs of a clause by contraction reduces its multiplicity in all bounded
search spaces (strictly, beyond a certain threshold of the bound). It follows that C2
may reduce the multiplicities of clauses at least as much as C1 . Thus, for all i0,
there exists a k0, such that for all . # S*I1=S*I2 , \j>0, 2mulG2k(., j)
2mulGi1 (., j). It follows that \j>0, 2space(G
2
k , j)pmul 2space(G
1
i , j). K
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We conclude with two corollaries that show how, under additional conditions,
the higher reduction of the bounded search spaces of C2 translates into smaller
bounded search spaces. In the first corollary, we measure the impact of contraction
on the portion of the search space induced by the set of expansion rules Ie . This
is relevant, because 7 is uniformly fair with respect to Ie . For this purpose, let
ateG(v) denote the set of ancestor-graphs of v that are made of expansion steps only.
Then we can define a measure that counts only ancestor-graphs in ateG(v):
espace(G, j)= :
v # V, v{T
emulG(v, j) } l(v),
where emulG(v, j)=|[t | t # ateG(v), 0< gdistG(t) j]|. Accordingly, we have
2espace(Gi , j)= :
v # V, v{T
2emulGi (v, j) } l(v),
where 2emulGi (v, j)=emulG0(v, j)&emulGi (v, j). Since the two strategies have the
same set of expansion inference rules, we have ateG1(.)=at
e
G2(.), and therefore
emulG10(., j)=emulG20(., j), for all . # S*I1=S*I2 . Thus, espace(G
1
0 , j)=espace(G
2
0 , j)
for all j>0, and we have the following:
Corollary 6.1. For all i0, _k0, such that \j>0, espace(G2k , j)Pmul
espace(G1i , j).
Proof. By the same proof of Theorem 6.1, we have that for all i0, _k0,
such that \j>0, 2espace(G2k , j)pmul 2espace(G1i , j). By definition, for all j>0,
espace(G1i , j)=espace(G
1
0 , j)&2espace(G
1
i , j) and espace(G
2
k , j)=espace(G
2
0 , j)&
2espace(G2k , j). Since espace(G
1
0 , j)=espace(G
2
0 , j) for all j>0, the thesis
follows. K
The second corollary applies to the special case where all rules in I2&I1 are deletion
rules, such as subsumption and tautology deletion. In this case, the only difference
between G1 and G2 is given by additional contraction arcs ending on vertex T in
G2. Since these arcs do not contribute to the ancestor-graphs of any clause different
from true, it follows that for all . # S*I1=S*I2 , and for all j>0, mulG10(., j)=
mulG20(., j). Thus, space(G
1
0 , j)=space(G
2
0 , j) for all j>0. Therefore, under this
additional assumption, we have the following:
Corollary 6.2. For all i0, _k0, such that \j>0, space(G2k , j)Pmul
space(G1i , j).
Proof. By definition, for all j>0, space(G1i , j)=space(G
1
0 , j)&2space(G
1
i , j)
and space(G2k , j)=space(G
2
0 , j)&2space(G
2
k , j). Since space(G
1
0 , j)=space(G
2
0 , j)
for all j>0, the thesis follows from Theorem 6.1. K
To summarize, a strategy with a more powerful redundancy criterion induces a
higher reduction of the bounded search spaces, that is, a higher reduction of search
complexity. The property that contraction rules preserve completeness means that
this contraction of the search space is done in such a way that the capability of the
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strategy to reach the empty clause is not impaired. Furthermore, since the search
space is contracted, a solution may be found sooner.
7. DISCUSSION
In this section first we discuss the relation with other works, and then we
summarize our contributions. We conclude with some directions for future work.
7.1. Comparison with Related Work
Contraction inference rules based on well-founded orderings were developed over
several years by many authors. We cite at least [6, 22, 35], and we refer to [14]
for a systematic treatment and more references. The idea that contraction helps by
reducing the search space in some intuitive sense appeared as early as [22]. It was
intuitively clear that contraction helps not only by deleting clauses, but also
because deletions prevent other clauses from being generated. The notion of
redundancy was developed to capture this effect [712, 14, 35, 37]. The purpose of
these works as far as redundancy is concerned was to define it properly at the level
of the inference system. They were not concerned with search, the measurement of
search spaces, and the formal comparison of strategies. Thus, while intuitive
explanations of the advantage of contraction have been known in theorem proving
for a long time, they were never turned into formal results.
A main reason for this is that it was not known how to approach the problem
of the infinite search space. Contraction and all other forms of redundancy control
do not make the search space finite. If we delete finitely many branches in an
infinite search space we still have an infinite search space: how do we compare two
infinite spaces to say that one is ‘‘smaller’’? This is precisely the question that our
result on the bounded search spaces begins to answer. To our knowledge, ours is
the first approach to formulate and address questions of this nature.
Most of the results obtained by applying classical complexity theory to theorem
proving are results on the complexity of propositional proofs. This line of research
originated in [41]. Since the result by Cook and Reckhow in [17] that NP=
co&NP if and only if there is a polynomially bounded proof system for the
classical (propositional) tautologies, the goal of the ‘‘Cook’s program’’ has been to
prove that there is no polynomially bounded proof system in order to prove that
NP{co&NP. A survey of the results in this subfield of complexity theory can be
found in [43].
The research that we have reported in this paper is different in many ways from
this type of research in complexity theory. First, we are interested in general
theorem proving, which entails working with infinite search spaces that are not
considered by classical complexity theory. Second, we study theorem-proving
strategies, not proof systems. A proof system as defined in [17], according to [43],
is a function f such that f (x)= y if x is a string representing a proof and y is a
string representing the tautology proved by x. The proof system f is polynomially-
bounded if the length of x is polynomially bounded by the length of y. The definition
of proof system captures a notion of proof checking, i.e., whether x is a legitimate
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proof and what x is a proof of, rather than the notion of theorem proving, or searching
for a proof, that we work with.
The measure proof length is appropriate for the purpose of Cook’s program, and
therefore it is generally adopted as the complexity measure. On the other hand, an
important part of our work has been to define complexity measures that are
appropriate for the problem of searching for proofs in infinite spaces. One may
remark that the size of the generated proof is a lower bound of the size of the
visited search space. While this is generally true, there are two fundamental reasons
why proof size is not a suitable measure for search in theorem proving. First, a
proof cannot be measured until it is available. But when the theorem-proving
strategy has generated a proof the theorem-proving problem has been solved and
the complexity of searching for a solution has disappeared. Second, experiments in
theorem proving show that it may be necessary to search a larger portion of the
search space in order to find a shorter proof. Let C1 and C2 be two strategies, that
generate proofs P1 and P2 for a given problem, visiting search spaces G*1 and G*2 ,
respectively. Even if P1 is smaller than G*1 and P2 is smaller than G*2 , it may be that
P1 is greater than P2 , while G*1 is smaller than G*2 . In other words, comparison of
search spaces cannot be reduced to comparison of proofs, because going from
search spaces to proofs does not preserve in general the ordering relation.
Another existing line of research works with complexity measures based on
Herbrand theorem, such as the size of the smallest unsatisfiable set of ground instances
of the input clauses (e.g., [20, 31, 38]). The remarks made above for the measure
proof length also apply to these measures. Until the strategy has succeeded, we do
not have an unsatisfiable set of ground instances. In fact, we do not even know
whether one exists. Therefore, we cannot use it to evaluate the behaviour of the
strategy. The measures based on the Herbrand theorem are suitable to study lower
bounds for sets of clauses, but they are not applicable to strategy analysis.
Finally, both Cook’s program and the complexity studies based on Herbrand
theorem seek lower bounds, e.g., exponential lower bounds for propositional proof
systems. Since we are motivated by the practice of theorem proving, we are inter-
ested in upper bounds, that is, in results about the strategies. It is premature to
obtain upper bounds such as those of algorithm analysis, but we can begin to
compare strategies and analyze how their features affect their behaviour.
7.2. Summary
In this paper we have proposed an approach towards the analysis of theorem-
proving strategies. Our motivation has been a long-standing gap between the theory
and practice of theorem proving. On one hand, there are indeed theorem-proving
strategies whose implementations are capable of solving significant problems. On the
other hand, there is no theory of ‘‘strategy analysis,’’ comparable to algorithm
analysis, for studying the complexity of such strategies. As a consequence, theorem-
proving strategies are usually evaluated in a purely empirical manner, by comparing
the run-times of their implementations. This is clearly unsatisfactory, since theorem
provers are complex objects made of many components, and it is difficult to establish
how different components contribute to the observed results. Also, at least in
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principle, it is impossible to draw general conclusions through experimentation,
because testing cannot be exhaustive.
Since the analysis of strategies is a new area of investigation, we had to formulate
almost everything from scratch. Our model comprises the representation of
search, a notion of complexity of search in infinite search spaces, and measures
of complexity of search. We summarize here the most important features of this
approach. The structure of the search space of a theorem-proving problem, as
induced by the inference mechanism of the strategy, is represented by a search
graph. For instance, if a strategy features resolution and another strategy features
ordered resolution, the search graph for the former contains arcs for all resolution
steps, whereas the search graph for the latter only contains arcs for the ordered
resolution steps. Other refinements of expansion rules, such as the critical pair
criteria of [5] can be captured in the same way. The selection of inferences by the
search plan of the strategy is represented by the marking of the vertices in the
hypergraph. We have pointed out that both the graph and its marking are needed
to represent contraction: since contraction inferences may generate clauses, the
graph needs to have arcs for the contraction steps; since only clauses that were
generated may be deleted by contraction, the marking needs to be used to represent
deletions. The search graph and its marking are equally important components of
the representation, similar to inference mechanism and search plan in a theorem-
proving strategy.
The second contribution of our approach is a notion of complexity of search that
is suitable for search problems whose space is infinite. The complexity of an algo-
rithm expresses the complexity of its computation from initial step to final step,
generally as a function of a measure of its input data. A search strategy also works
on a finite amount of data, but this data represents only a portion of the infinite
search space that the strategy is exploring. Since the search space is infinite, derivations
may not halt. Therefore, we have proposed a notion of complexity that involves
two domains: the ‘‘present’’ and the ‘‘future.’’ Intuitively, the former captures
the complexity of the computation performed so far, and the latter captures the
potential complexity of what remains to be done. At each stage k of a derivation,
the complexity on the domain ‘‘present’’ is measured by the multisets Sk of existing
clauses, and the complexity on the domain ‘‘future’’ is measured by the bounded
search spaces [space(Gk , j)] j0 . These complexity measures have a few properties
that we regard as important:
v The infinity that is inherent to the theorem-proving problem (infinite search
space and potentially infinite computation) appears in that the succession
[space(Gk , j)] j0 is infinite. However, each of the space(Gk , j) is finite and there-
fore bounded search spaces may be compared.
v The definition of space(Gk , j) is based on a dynamic notion of distance, in
such a way that space(Gk , j) reflects the consequences of the inferences performed
up to stage k on the unexplored search space.
v All objects being compared are multisets of clauses. Multisets, rather than
sets, are appropriate, because theorem-proving derivations may generate duplicates,
or variants, of clauses.
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v All multisets are compared by the multiset extension of a well-founded
ordering on clause that is in turn the multiset extension of a well-founded ordering
on atoms. This ordering plays for theorem-proving strategies the role that the
natural ordering on N usually plays for algorithms. This reflects the fact that in
theorem proving, and more generally in computation based on deduction, the
underlying universe is the Herbrand base, rather than the natural numbers.
Once measures of complexity are available, we can apply them to compare
different strategies independently of their implementation. In this paper, we have
applied them to compare strategies with the same search plan, the same expansion
rules, but different contraction capabilities, proving that strategies with higher
contraction power have smaller search complexity according to the above measures.
7.3. Directions for Future Work
Since very little work has been done on the analysis of infinite search problems,
there are many possibilities for further research. We shall mention a few.
One area for future work is the continuation of the effort to provide foundations
for strategy analysis. We give an example that helps to point out the issues. Assume
to have the set of clauses [P(a), cP(a), a&b], where aob, and a strategy that
features simplification and an eager-contraction search plan. The strategy will first
reduce P(a) to P(b), then reduce cP(a) to cP(b), and finally deduce the empty
clause from P(b) and cP(b). At each simplification step the multiset of present
clauses and the bounded search spaces become smaller. However, the eager application
of simplification does not reduce the number of executed steps. On the contrary,
for this set, a strategy without simplification generates g in one step from P(a) and
cP(a), and therefore performs fewer steps. On one hand, this observation is trivial,
because if the empty clause can be generated in one step, it is obvious that the
number of steps cannot be reduced. On the other hand, it means that a reduction
of search complexity according to our measures does not necessarily imply a reduction
of the number of steps for all theorem-proving problems.
Pruning the search space by contraction may not reduce the number of steps,
because the contraction steps need to be included in the step count. A strategy that
visits and prunes the search space is more sophisticated than a strategy that merely
visits the search space. This higher sophistication may induce more work and incur
cost. Similar to algorithms, the more sophisticated strategy typically will not out-
perform the simpler strategy on all input problems. Since sophistication has a cost,
the more sophisticated strategy will perform better on problems that are sufficiently
hard that the advantage of pruning the search space offsets the disadvantage of
consuming resources to prune it.
In analysis of algorithms, the above point is taken into account by working
asymptotically. That is, one says that algorithm A with time complexity f (n), where
n is the length of the input, is better than algorithm B with time complexity g(n),
if there exist k and c such that for all nk, f (n)c } g(n). A ‘‘sufficiently hard
problem’’ is captured by a ‘‘sufficiently long input.’’ For first-order theorem proving,
this is not possible in these terms, because no known measure of the input captures
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how hard the problem is. However, our observations suggest that an asymptotic
approach to search complexity is needed for strategy analysis.
Search complexity as measured by our measures and time complexity are
different in nature. The latter alone is not suitable for infinite search problems. In
this paper we provided tools to analyze search complexity during a derivation. Future
research may include investigating relationship between the search complexity and
the time complexity of terminating derivations, possibly in the framework of an
asymptotic analysis of search complexity.
Other directions for future investigations consist in applying a search complexity
approach to other methods in theorem proving or in artificial intelligence. We feel
that the main ideas in our work, such as the distinction between present and future,
the notions of dynamic distance and bounded search spaces, may capture essential
aspects of infinite search, and therefore may be relevant to other problems where
infinite search is involved. Other aspects are not as essential, and may be modified
as needed. For instance, the assumption that the state of a derivation is a single
component depends on having in mind strategies that work primarily by forward
reasoning, that is, generate clauses from the axioms and the negation of the
theorem until an empty clause is generated.
A possible direction for future work is to apply our approach to analyze back-
ward-reasoning strategies, that work by reducing goals to subgoals. In such a case
the state of a derivation, and therefore the complexity measure on the present, may
be modified to express that an essential component of the current state is the
current goal. Subgoal-reduction strategies do not feature contraction. Rather,
experimental studies [4] and theoretical analysis [33] showed that techniques for
lemmaizing or caching can reduce the search effort for these strategies. Thus, one
may analyze how such techniques may affect the complexity of search in the search
space of the goals.
Another direction for future research is to extend our approach to compare
strategies that have different search plans, since in this paper we have focused on
strategies that differ in the inference system but have the same search plan. Finally,
we plan to work towards the analysis of strategies for parallel or distributed
theorem proving.
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